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Conflict and Contract Law 
 
This article examines an under-explored reason to have contract law: conflict minimization. 
An important function of contract law, the article contends, is to diminish the wasted time, 
effort, and resources spent on disputes over economic exchange, and to reduce the incidence 
of harm resulting from these disputes. Minimizing conflict typically serves the parties’ own 
interests, and it also serves the public interest in social peace. These insights have 
implications not just for contract law as a whole but also for its doctrinal details. The article 
thus discusses how several doctrines of substantive contract law help to minimize conflict, 
without claiming that currently prevailing contract law regimes are perfectly adapted to this 
aim. Finally, it defends the normative claim that conflict minimization should be considered 
one of contract law’s goals. 
*    *    *    * 
Why should the state get involved in contractual disputes? It is far from obvious what 
justifies the use of scarce resources and the state’s coercive authority to adjudicate claims of 
wrongdoing between parties to economic exchange. For some, contractual enforcement is 
necessary to protect the parties’ fundamental rights to freedom or autonomy.1 Others look 
instead for the instrumental benefits, the valuable consequences, that contract law brings 
about.2 In that vein, Arthur Corbin identified two ‘chief purposes for which the remedy in 
damages for breach of contract is given’. 3 Corbin’s first purpose was, and is, commonplace: 
                                                        
1 For theories of contract law based on the parties’ right to autonomy, see Charles Fried, Contract as Promise: A 
Theory of Contractual Obligation (Harvard UP 1981); Randy E Barnett, ‘A Consent Theory of Contract’ (1986) 
86 Colum L Rev 269; Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy (Harvard 
UP 2009) ch 5. 
2 See Liam Murphy, ‘The Practice of Promise and Contract’ in Gregory Klass, George Letsas, and Prince Saprai 
(eds), Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law (OUP 2014). 
3 Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, vol 5 (2nd edn, West Publishing 1964) 23. 
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‘the prevention of similar breaches in the future’.4 In the decades since Corbin’s remark, law-
and-economics scholars have elaborated and refined the idea that contract law’s purpose is to 
prevent—or, instead, to put an appropriate price on—future breaches of contract.5 
But Corbin identified another instrumental purpose for contractual liability: ‘the 
avoidance of private war’.6 This second purpose has not spawned nearly so much subsequent 
development or reflection as the first.7 Corbin himself does not seem to have pursued the 
thought,8 and it appears only briefly and sporadically in philosophical discussions about 
contract law’s foundations. These discussions remain focused instead on the relationship 
between promissory morality and contract law. That may be because theorists of contract law 
tend to eschew discussion of the realities of contract law litigation.9 While promissory 
morality may fit the rules and principles that appear in contract law textbooks,10 the law in 
                                                        
4 ibid. 
5 Economic analysts focus not so much on the prevention of future breaches as the prevention of future 
inefficient breaches. For a review, see Gregory Klass, ‘Efficient Breach’ in Gregory Klass, George Letsas, and 
Prince Saprai (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law (OUP 2014).  
6 Corbin (n 3) 23. 
7 The claim may remind some readers of the ‘civil recourse’ account of tort law, an account Goldberg and 
Zipursky, its leading proponents, believe can be extended to contract law. See John CP Goldberg and Benjamin 
C Zipursky, ‘Civil Recourse Revisited’ (2011) 39 Florida State U L Rev 341, 347–56. More specifically, 
Nathan Oman has sought to apply a particular version of civil recourse ideas to contract law. See Nathan Oman, 
‘Contract as Consent to Retaliation: A Civil Recourse Theory of Contractual Liability’ (2011) 96 Iowa L Rev 
529. I explore the relationship between the claim in this article and civil recourse theory generally in Part 3 
below, and mention some specific disagreements with Oman’s particular understanding of contract law as 
‘consent to retaliation’ at notes 114 and 132. 
8 It has occasionally seeped into the writings of Joseph Perillo, who updated Corbin’s treatise. See Joseph M 
Perillo, ‘Misreading Holmes on Tortious Interference’ (2000) 68 Fordhcam L Rev 1085, 1092–93: ‘The law 
seeks to protect reliance and expectancies, and to preserve peace and tranquility. Breaches—even efficient 
breaches—tend not only to disappoint expectations, but also to precipitate private disputes. … [D]amages and 
other legal remedies are substitutes for private warfare.’ 
9 Brian H Bix, ‘The Role of Contract: Stewart Macaulay’s Lessons from Practice’, in Jean Braucher, John 
Kidwell and William C Whitford (eds), Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay (Hart 
Publishing 2013). For a qualified defence of this stance, see Stephen A Smith, Contract Theory (OUP 2004) 34-
35. Even beyond self-consciously theoretical works, ‘most books on contract do not actually include a chapter 
on dispute resolution processes’. Linda Mulcahy and John Tillotson, Contract Law in Perspective (5th edn, 
Routledge-Cavendish 2008) 194. 
10  Some commentators doubt even the fit between promissory morality and the textbook rules of contract law. 
Seana Valentine Shiffrin, ‘The Divergence of Contract and Promise’ (2007) 120 Harv L Rev 708. Compare 
Jody S Kraus, ‘The Correspondence of Contract and Promise’ (2009) 109 Colum L Rev 1603. 
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action famously diverges from law in those books. Once one considers the ‘settlement 
culture’ that pervades contemporary litigation, Corbin’s idea of contract lawsuits as an 
alternative to private warfare immediately begins to seem a more plausible aim for contract 
law. Contractual disputes, like other disputes, usually end in agreed settlements, a result 
strongly encouraged by the legal system.11 To the extent that Corbin’s second purpose has 
resurfaced, then, it has often arisen from reflection on empirical and historical studies of 
contract disputes. In the course of one such reflection, Hugh Collins suggests that ‘the 
dominant purpose [of the regulation of contracts] should be the peaceful resolution of the 
dispute’.12 
In a similar spirit, this article aims to defend conflict-management as a purpose for 
contract law. More precisely, the article shows that one of the reasons for having contract law 
and contract adjudication is to reduce the incidence and severity of disputes between parties 
to agreements to engage in economic exchange. Disputes over contracts can result in several 
kinds of unfortunate consequences. For one thing, the parties to a dispute must spend time 
and energy wrangling with one another that would otherwise be directed to more fruitful 
ends. Moreover, a dispute may damage, or bring to an end, an otherwise mutually beneficial 
relationship. Most dramatically, though violence is admittedly a remote possibility in many 
settings, contractual disputes do sometimes result in physical injuries and property damage. 
The claim is that suitably designed contract law helps to minimize these various harms.  
                                                        
11 Stewart Macaulay, ‘An Empirical View of Contract’ [1985] Wisconsin L Rev 465, 470: ‘Even when contract 
law might offer a remedy, the legal system in operation promotes giving up or settling rather than adjudicating 
to vindicate rights.’ 
12 Hugh Collins, Regulating Contracts (OUP 1999) 321. David Campbell, similarly alive to the realities of 
dispute resolution, has made the related claim that the promotion of co-operation between the parties in response 
to breach should be recognized as a crucial principle of contract remedies. David Campbell, ‘The Relational 
Constitution of Remedy: Co-operation as the Implicit Second Principle of Remedies for Breach of Contract’ 
(2005) 11 Texas Wesleyan L Rev 455. 
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By way of clarification: it would also be possible to propose a different version of the 
claim that contract law contributes to social peace. Many of the great thinkers of the 
Enlightenment contended that participation in commerce makes individuals and nations less 
prone to aggression. According to these thinkers, who include Montesquieu, David Hume, 
and Adam Smith, the preoccupation with honour during the feudal age brought a constant 
danger of conflict. But in a market setting, enlightened self-interest serves as an effective 
check on unruly passions. According to Albert Hirschman, who labelled this idea the ‘doux-
commerce thesis’, ‘[t]here was much talk, from the late seventeenth century on, about the 
douceur of commerce ... sweetness, softness, calm, and gentleness ... the antonym of 
violence’.13 The doux-commerce thesis is a claim about markets rather than about contract 
law. But to the extent that contract law supports markets, one could try to justify contract 
law’s existence on the ground that it helps to channel people towards more peaceful forms of 
social life.14 This article, however, does not seek to defend the claim that markets soothe 
conflict better than other forms of social and economic organization.15 Indeed, the article 
assumes that self-interested exchange relationships often contain the seeds of conflict,16 and 
                                                        
13 Albert O Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before its Triumph 
(Princeton UP 1977) 59.  
14 For a recent argument along these lines, see Nathan B Oman, The Dignity of Commerce: Markets and the 
Moral Foundations of Contract Law (University of Chicago Press 2016). Oman contends that contract law 
supports well-functioning markets, and that well-functioning markets ‘provide a framework for peaceful and 
productive cooperation in the face of the pervasive pluralism of contemporary society’. ibid 40. 
15 A long-established line of political thought – oddly enough, barely mentioned by Oman (n 14) – argues for 
the opposite conclusion. Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol 1 (first published 1867, 
Penguin Books 1976). Pashukanis’s Marxist theory of law, for example, takes as one of its assumptions that the 
parties to capitalist exchange relationships are inherently antagonistic to one another. Evgeny Pashukanis, 
‘General Theory of Law and Marxism: Chapter 5’ in Evgeny Pashukanis, Selected Writings on Marxism and 
Law (Academic Press 1980).  
16 ‘Exchanges are peacefully resolved wars, and wars are the result of unsuccessful transactions’. Claude Lévi-
Strauss, The Elementary Structures of Kinship (first published 1949, Eyre & Spottiswoode 1969) 67. 
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that the best hope for legal and social institutions is to manage conflict, rather than to try to 
eliminate it.17  
Some degree of contractual conflict is inescapable, even healthy; but, as Ian Macneil 
points out, ‘uncontrolled conflict is the antithesis of continuing social behaviour’.18 The 
questions the article addresses are as follows: assuming a certain level of self-interested 
economic exchange, does contract law help to control conflict over that exchange? If so, what 
particular features of contract law tend to support this aim? And should conflict management 
rightly be considered a goal for contract law? Answering these questions in turn, the article 
provides evidence in section 1 that contract law contributes to conflict-minimization. In 
section 2, the article moves from the institution of contract law as a whole to particular 
contract law doctrines, selecting some that make a special contribution to the goal of 
minimizing harms resulting from disputes. In section 3, the article advances a qualified 
normative claim: conflict-minimization should be considered one of contract law’s goals, 
though it would be wrong to make it contract law’s sole concern. In contract law, as 
elsewhere, the collective desire to maintain harmony must sometimes yield to other important 
societal aims. But any tension between preserving peace and doing justice is less acute than it 
may seem at first glance. In particular, because peaceful dispute processes typically serve the 
parties’ joint interests, it is typically fair to say that they have implicitly agreed—or, more 
realistically, that they would have agreed—to an approach to contractual adjudication that 
leads to more harmonious relationships and less wasteful disputes.  
                                                        
17 Throughout this article, I will tend to speak of minimizing or managing conflicts, rather than resolving them. 
For a similar usage in the historical literature, arguing for a shift in historical research from ‘conflict resolution’ 
to ‘conflict management’, see Alain Wijffels, ‘Introduction: Commercial Quarrels – and How (Not) to Handle 
Them’ (2017) 32 Continuity and Change 1, 6.   
18 Ian Macneil, ‘Values in Contract: Internal and External’ (1983) 78 Northwestern U L Rev 340, 353. 
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1. Contract Law’s Contribution to Conflict-Minimization 
Does contract law have the effect of minimizing conflict? By ‘contract law’, for the 
moment,19 I mean the option for a party to seek redress for complaints against the other party, 
before a neutral third party with the authority to make binding decisions, ultimately backed 
by the coercive power of the state (including via arbitration).20 The aim of this section is to 
show that the involvement, or potential involvement, of an independent and powerful third-
party adjudicator helps to minimize conflict over economic exchange in at least three ways. 
First, the possibility of being made accountable before a third party helps to secure 
compliance with perceived norms of behaviour in economic exchange, thereby stopping 
disputes from arising in the first place. Second, if a dispute does arise, the presence of 
contract law channels the dispute towards calmer modes of disputation, as opposed to more 
harmful or wasteful forms of conflict. Third, both before and after disputes arise, the prospect 
of a review of the parties’ positions by a neutral third party tends to bring the parties’ 
viewpoints closer together, nudging the parties towards agreed solutions to problems that 
arise during the performance of their agreements.  
To be sure, invoking the legal system is just one of a range of possible ways to respond to 
disputes. Law’s impact on behaviour, including contractual behaviour, is sometimes 
overstated.21 As a colossal literature in economics, anthropology, and sociology shows, in 
                                                        
19 I will say more about what a body of contract law devoted to conflict-minimization should look like in section 
2 below. 
20 At least, I mean to include arbitration in circumstances where the state courts will enforce the arbitration 
award. The empirical literature contains many discussions of what we might call borderline cases between 
contract law and informal norms, such as private arbitration conducted by trade associations. Eg Lisa Bernstein, 
‘Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry’ (1992) 21 J of 
Legal Studies 115.  
21 Macaulay’s classic study of Wisconsin manufacturers and distributors showed that contract law is often 
marginal to economic exchange. Stewart Macaulay, ‘Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary 
Study’ (1963) 29 American Sociological Rev 55. At the same time, Macaulay did not conclude that contract law 
had no effect on behaviour—in fact, he has devoted a great deal of effort to figuring out what contract law’s 
effects are. See, for example, the articles cited in notes 85 and 179 below.  
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small groups, interactions can be, and often have been, governed peacefully by informal 
norms.22 People who share membership in such groups often rely on interpersonal trust and 
reputation to induce compliance with norms, and informal norms about how to respond to 
claimed wrongdoing can limit the risks of escalating retaliation.23 Still, interpersonal trust, 
informal norms, and reputational sanctions are much less effective in interactions between 
relative strangers. As some of the examples discussed below show, strangers will sometimes 
see fit to engage in economic exchange even though they do not share membership in a close-
knit community. In such cases, contract law is more likely to be significant in helping to 
contain their disputes. For these reasons, economic historians studying the emergence of 
state-sponsored adjudication of commercial disputes tend to conclude that ‘whatever informal 
modalities of conflict resolution and management may have coexisted within a polity, some 
degree of a formal justice system was needed in order to back up or supplement the more 
informal modalities’.24 
One way to help uncover contract law’s dispute-reduction value is to consider the 
counterfactual: what happens without contract law? Without contract law, contracts, in the 
economic sense of the term, are still made.25 People still make agreements to engage in 
economic exchange with an element of future performance, thereby exposing one or both 
parties to the risk of opportunistic behaviour. But, unless they wish to rely solely on the good 
motives of those with whom they deal, parties need to find alternative mechanisms for 
                                                        
22 See Avner Greif, ‘Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders’ (1989) 
49 J of Economic History 857; Robert C Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes 
(Harvard UP 1994). 
23 Ellickson (n 22) 253: ‘In Shasta County, feuds are rare because remedial norms strictly regulate self-help by 
calling for punishment of persons who respond with excessive force.’  
24 Wijffels (n 17) 4.  
25 For a discussion of the various meanings of ‘contract’, see Karl Llewellyn, ‘What Price Contract? An Essay 
in Perspective’ (1931) 40 Yale LJ 704, 707–08. On one meaning of the word, contracts are agreements to 
engage in economic exchange ‘irrespective of their legal consequences—irrespective indeed of whether they 
have legal consequences’. ibid 708. Compare Joseph Raz, ‘Promises in Morality and Law’ (1982) 95 Harv L 
Rev 916, 917 fn 4 (adopting ‘the convention of regarding contracts as legally binding agreements’). 
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decreasing the likelihood of misconduct, and thus, for responding to disputes when the 
parties cannot agree on the proper response to an allegation of wrongdoing. These 
mechanisms are frequently less effective for the purpose of minimizing conflict, and may 
even result in violence, as I show in section A below. But, to be clear: violence is only the 
most extreme kind of negative consequence of disputes, and it will often be a remote 
possibility. For that reason, I will proceed in section B to consider subtler, and often more 
practically significant, instances of negative consequences arising from disputes, 
consequences that having contract law also helps to minimize.  
A. Extreme Cases: Violent Disputes 
The idea that third-party adjudication is more peaceful than other forms of dispute-resolution 
is far from unique to contract law. Legal scholars trying to say something profound about the 
purpose of law as a whole often commend litigation as a superior alternative to violent self-
help.26 Access to courts is widely understood as ‘necessary to civil society because in the 
event that individuals cannot resolve their disputes on their own, they may resort to 
violence’.27  The idea that state-sponsored adjudication is a better alternative to the private 
use of force is also commonplace in political philosophy and legal theory. To take a famous 
example, H.L.A. Hart made the idea an important part of the famous fable he told to illustrate 
the distinctive features of legal systems.28 Hart first posited a ‘pre-legal’ society without 
legislators, courts, or other officials, governed only by customary social rules. One of the 
                                                        
26 To take a representative quotation in a long-running genre: ‘The first impulse of a rudimentary soul is to do 
justice by his own hand. Only at the cost of mighty historical efforts has it been possible to supplant in the 
human soul the idea of self-obtained justice by the idea of justice entrusted to authorities’. Eduardo J Couture, 
‘The Nature of the Judicial Process’ (1950) 25 Tulane L Rev 1, 7. See also Michael Bayles, ‘Principles for 
Legal Procedure’ (1986) 5 Law and Philosophy 33, 57 (legal resolution of disputes is ‘preferable to blood feuds, 
rampant crime and violence, and so on’).  
27 Alexandra Lahav, ‘The Roles of Litigation in American Democracy’ (2016) 65 Emory LJ 101, 102. 
28 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (3rd edn, Clarendon Press 2012) ch 5. See John Gardner, ‘Why Law Might 
Emerge: Hart’s Problematic Fable’ in Luis Duarte d’Almeida, James Edwards, and Andrea Dolcetti (eds), 
Reading HLA Hart’s The Concept of Law (Hart Publishing 2013). 
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deficiencies Hart attributed to this pre-legal society was the ‘inefficiency’ of the diffuse 
social pressure that enforces customary rules. Hart actually divided this problem into two 
separate sub-problems. First, rules inevitably give rise to frequent disputes over whether they 
have been broken in a particular case. Without an arbiter to provide an authoritative answer, 
disputes over alleged rule-violations are likely to ‘continue interminably’.29 A second 
problem of inefficiency concerns the administration of sanctions without a special agency 
empowered to impose them. A customary-rules society would have reason to lament not only 
‘the waste of time involved in the group’s unorganized efforts to catch and punish offenders’, 
but also ‘the smouldering vendettas which may result from self-help in the absence of an 
official monopoly of sanctions’.30 The remedy for these problems is to supplement customary 
rules with a ‘rule of adjudication’,31 which confers authority on officials to determine 
whether there has been a breach of the law in a particular case, and to determine the 
appropriate sanction for breach. 
Legal scholars have also examined the relationship between private violence and 
particular areas of law. Most obviously, criminal law is often conceptualized as a 
replacement for a private right to use force in self-defence or, more bleakly, as an attempt to 
domesticate the human urge for violent retribution.32 The area of private law most often 
characterized as a replacement for interpersonal violence is tort law.33 On one view, the real 
purpose of tort damages for non-pecuniary loss is not to compensate but ‘to put the plaintiff 
                                                        
29 Hart (n 28) 93. 
30 ibid. 
31 ibid 97. 
32 Eg James Q Whitman, ‘Between Self-Defense and Vengeance/Between Social Contract and Monopoly of 
Violence’ (2004) 39 Tulsa L Rev 901.  
33 See, eg, Scott Hershovitz, ‘Tort as a Substitute for Revenge’ in John Oberdiek (ed), Philosophical 
Foundations of the Law of Torts (OUP 2014); Benjamin C Zipursky, ‘Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law 
of Torts’ (1998) 51 Vanderbilt L Rev 1, 85; John CP Goldberg, ‘The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due 
Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs’ (2005) 115 Yale LJ 524, 602. 
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in possession of a sum of money which in the court’s judgement ought to be enough to 
satisfy his vindictive feelings against the wrongdoer’.34 Tort law has been defended against 
its critics on the ground that it staves off vengeance: ‘it is preferable to pursue a wrong-doer 
with a writ rather than with a rifle’.35 But is the problem Hart identified—of smouldering 
vendettas that continue interminably—relevant to contract disputes?  
Historical examples suggest that where parties to economic exchange lack a formal third-
party adjudicator, less salutary dispute resolution mechanisms often arise to fill the gap.36 For 
example, in Old Testament Israel, ‘disputes over contract terms were likely to lead to 
violence and even blood feuds’.37 In medieval Europe, too, spirals of violent retaliation often 
emerged from exchange agreements gone wrong. To be sure, studies of medieval commerce 
have shown that, even without an overarching government with authority to enforce 
contracts, small networks of traders were sometimes able to use reputational mechanisms to 
stabilize and facilitate commerce, without resort to bloodshed.38 But, then as now, economic 
exchange did not always take place within tight-knit reputational networks. In medieval 
Germany, commercial disputes between merchants in different towns often gave rise to 
lengthy and devastating feuds between their towns.39 Until the fifteenth century, ‘collective 
reprisals were regarded as legitimate and were frequently practiced’.40 Disagreement over 
                                                        
34 JM Kelly, ‘The Inner Nature of the Tort Action’ (1967) 2 Irish Jurist (New Series) 279, 287.  
35 AM Linden, ‘Faulty No-Fault: A Critique of the Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on Motor Vehicle 
Accident Compensation’ (1975) 13 Osgoode Hall LJ 448, 457. 
36 John D Calamari and Joseph M Perillo, The Law of Contracts (4th edn, West Publishing 1998) para 1.4: 
‘Before courts, there was the feud—private vengeance. ... In modern law, where contract law refuses to enter, 
vengeance and self-help fill the vacuum.’ 
37 Geoffrey P Miller, ‘Contracts of Genesis’ (1993) 22 J of Legal Studies 15.  
38 Greif (n 22). 
39 Oliver Volckart, ‘The Economics of Feuding in Late Medieval Germany’ (2004) 41 Explorations in 
Economic History 282. 
40 ibid 286. 
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commercial transactions was one of the most common causes of these feuds.41 These feuds 
were not anarchic; the parties were governed by rules restricting their initiation. But, once the 
feud was commenced, there were few restrictions on the ‘plunder, looting and devastation’ 
one could visit on one’s opponent.42 In addition to the injuries and property damage 
occasioned by feuding, a feud disrupted trade between merchants of the two towns otherwise 
uninvolved in the dispute. Likewise, disputes over economic exchange in eighteenth and 
nineteenth century Montenegro often gave rise to feuds,43 and arguments over contracts 
sometimes sparked duels in the antebellum south.44  
In more recent history, a lack of state-provided contract enforcement aids the emergence 
of ‘organized crime’. As Schelling states, ‘when the law has no way of enforcing contract, 
the underworld provides it: a man submits to the prospect of personal violence as the last 
resort in contract enforcement’.45 To take a concrete example: according to the leading 
account of its emergence and persistence, the Sicilian mafia is an industry that promotes, 
produces, and sells private protection.46 Protection, Diego Gambetta explains, can be a 
‘genuine commodity and [can] play a crucial role as a lubricant of economic exchange’.47 In 
the wake of feudalism’s decline, weak state authorities in Sicily were unable to provide 
protection, thus creating a demand for the mafia’s product. The mafia’s customers sought 
protection against invasions of property rights, and also against breaches of agreements for 
                                                        
41 ibid 286–87.  
42 ibid 288. 
43 Christopher Boehm, Blood Revenge: The Enactment and Management of Conflict in Montenegro and Other 
Tribal Societies (University of Pennsylvania Press 1984) 88. 
44 For discussion of an example of a duel sparked by an unpaid promissory note, see Warren F Schwartz, Keith 
Baxter and David Ryan, ‘The Duel: Can These Gentlemen be Acting Efficiently?’ (1984) 13 J of Legal Studies 
331, 352  
45 Thomas C Schelling, Choice and Consequence: Perspectives of an Errant Economist (Harvard UP 1984) 168.  
46 Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection (Harvard UP 1993).  
47 ibid 2. 
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economic exchange. Thus, mafiosi in the nineteenth century protected buyers and sellers in 
disputes over sales of horses,48 and, in the twentieth century, in disputes over sales of used 
cars.49 Gambetta cites examples of mafiosi settling disputes over construction contracts,50 
labour contracts,51 and contracts for the use of land.52 Mafiosi also provided, and continue to 
provide, debt collection and debt postponement services.53 The Sicilian mafia is just one 
example; scholars have reached similar conclusions about organized crime in Russia54 and 
Japan,55 both places where, in different ways, there is a substantial gap between formal rights 
and their actual enforcement via the legal system.  
The mafia originally thrived where contracts were formally enforceable but practically 
unenforceable because the state legal system was too weak. Violence also often enters the 
picture where the agreement in question is illegal and hence unenforceable in the courts. One 
long-standing mafia activity is the enforcement of illegal cartel agreements.56 More 
generally, contemporary black-market commerce, a field in which participants are unable to 
harness legal protections against fraud or breach of contract, is often linked to systemic 
violence. According to Goldstein, ‘systemic violence arises from the exigencies of working 
or doing business in an illicit market—a context in which the monetary stakes can be 
enormous but where the economic actors have no recourse to the legal system to resolve 
                                                        
48 ibid 73–74. 
49 ibid 169–70. 
50 ibid 170.  
51 ibid 169. 
52 ibid 170. 
53 ibid 170–71. 
54 Federico Varese, The Russian Mafia: Private Protection in a New Market Economy (OUP 2006).  
55 Curtis J Milhaupt and Mark D West, Economic Organizations and Corporate Governance in Japan (OUP 
2004) ch 8. 
56 Oriana Bandiera, ‘Land Reform, the Market for Protection, and the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia: Theory and 
Evidence’ (2003) 19 J of Law, Economics, and Organization 218, 220. 
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disputes’.57 Research into illegal drug dealers explains that dealers need to establish a 
reputation for violence. As buyers, they need to avoid being supplied with poor quality 
product, and as sellers they need protection against failure to pay debts. So ‘violence 
substitutes for legal contract enforcement in the illegal drug market’.58 Elijah Anderson, 
writing about street-level crack dealers in the United States, explains how violence occurs 
even though the perpetrators do not particularly want to use it.59 Without any prospect of 
adjudication by a neutral third party, business arguments over drugs ‘are frequently settled on 
the spot, typically on the basis of arbitrary considerations, unfounded assumptions, or 
outright lies’.60 More troublingly, a sort of ‘code of the street’ emerges to regulate and justify 
the use of violence.61 To maintain ‘respect’, one must respond swiftly and harshly to signs of 
disrespect. In drugs transactions, this means that misunderstandings or unpaid debts 
frequently result in violent reprisals; the logic of the street is unforgiving.62 
                                                        
57 Paul J Goldstein, ‘The Drugs/Violence Nexus: A Tripartite Conceptual Framework’ (1985) 14 J of Drug 
Issues 493. For a useful review of scholarly hypotheses about the relationship between drug markets and 
violence, see Graham C Ousey and Matthew R Lee, ‘Investigating the Connections Between Race, Illicit Drug 
Markets, and Lethal Violence, 1984-1997’ (2004) 41 J of Research in Crime and Delinquency 352. 
58 US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Drugs, Crime, and the Justice System (U.S. 
Government Printing Office 1992).  
59 Elijah Anderson, The Code of the Street: Decency, Violence, and the Moral Life of the Inner City (WW 
Norton & Co 1999). See also Philippe Bourgois, In Search of Respect: Selling Crack in El Barrio (2nd edn, 
CUP 2003). 
60 Anderson (n 59) 117. 
61 As critics have pointed out, however, it may be misleading to describe these patterns of behaviour as a ‘code’. 
Loïc Wacquant, ‘Scrutinizing the Street: Poverty, Morality, and the Pitfalls of Urban Ethnography’ (2002) 107 
Am J of Sociology 1468, 1490–93. 
62 Anderson (n 59) 116. Illicit drug-dealing is not always drenched in quite so much violence. One study claims 
to show that drug dealers in the suburban United States abide instead by a less violent ‘code of the suburb’, 
whereby dealers typically respond to suspected contractual misconduct with negotiation, avoidance, and 
tolerance. Still, suburban dealers do sometimes seek to obtain vengeance; they tend to do so instead ‘via 
“sneaky” methods such as retaliatory rip-offs, unseen thefts (e.g., burglary), and vandalism’. Scott Jacques and 
Richard Wright, ‘The Code of the Suburb and Drug Dealing’ in The Oxford Handbook of Criminological 
Theory (OUP 2012). 
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Where the law refuses to enforce gambling debts, these, too are often a fertile source of 
disorderly contract disputes.64 For example, millions of people from mainland China visit 
Macau each year. Gambling debts are legally unenforceable in China. That does not mean 
that gambling debts incurred in Macau by Chinese gamblers go unenforced.65 One casino 
investor recently explained, euphemistically, that debts could be collected by ‘following the 
guy until he pays … If the guy has 10 guys, you need to have 50 guys following them. So 
that’s just part of that business … If you can’t enforce it in the legal system, what can you 
do?’66 The U.K. moved to an open, regulated gambling industry in part to deal with a 
problem of violent enforcement of gambling debts,67 and has now made gambling contracts 
legally enforceable, partly with the aim of keeping gambling crime-free.68  
Historians and social scientists differ among themselves as to how to understand violent 
forms of dispute-resolution. Feuding, for example, may flow from an aspect of human 
psychology that cannot be explained in rational-choice terms: a deep-rooted emotional 
compulsion or a desire for honour in the face of a perceived slight. 69 But some economic 
historians have interpreted feuding over contracts as rational and, on the whole, socially 
beneficial, arguing that it was a calculated mechanism for deterring wrongdoing and 
enhancing the credibility of promises, and, in turn, facilitating trade even without overarching 
authorities.70 Nevertheless, all seem to agree that feuding is, at most, a second-best solution 
                                                        
64 ‘Purported Enforcer for Naples Betting Ring Takes Plea Deal’ Naples Daily News (Naples, 8 May 2015): ‘On 
undercover surveillance tapes, [an illegal bookie] bragged about having a network of enforcers across the 
country, including Ross, calling him a Hannibal Lecter-type who “will bite your face off”.’ 
65 See Federico Varese, Mafias on the Move: How Organized Crime Conquers New Territory (Princeton UP 
2012) 166–69. 
66 James Ball, Harry Davies, Lowell Bergman, Matt Isaacs, and Simon Marks, ‘How China’s Macau Crackdown 
Threatens Big US Casino Moguls’ The Guardian (London, 23 April 2015).  
67 Roy Light, ‘The Gambling Act 2005: Regulatory Containment and Market Control’ (2007) 70 MLR 626.  
68 Gambling Act 2005, s 335(1). 
69 Jon Elster, ‘Norms of Revenge’ (1990) 100 Ethics 862.  
70 Volckart (n 39). 
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that should give way if more peaceful mechanisms are available and effective. Similarly, 
even if the emergence of a mafia as an enforcement mechanism has its pluses, it also brings 
with it unfortunate problems. To provide protection a mafioso must provoke fear in others; to 
provoke fear he must engage in otherwise gratuitous acts of violence and to react with 
extreme force if anyone challenges his honour. The use of violence to enforce contracts, as 
well as being harmful in itself, also supports and funds people with a tendency to use 
violence to get their way, a tendency that may spill over into other activities and areas of life. 
Informal institutions—unwritten rules of social behaviour—do most of the work of 
containing disputes over economic exchange, but they tend to suffer from weaknesses that 
restrict their ability to control violence: in addition to being biased towards more powerful 
interests, they may be unable to ‘elicit private information, resulting in costly negotiations’ 
and ‘without central enforcement, they may produce bargains that are difficult to keep’. 71 So 
it is no surprise that scholars of contemporary international development take the need for 
effective formal dispute-resolution systems as a prerequisite for economic advance. 
Otherwise, ‘[e]very … business deal or loan risks giving rise to a costly disagreement or 
dispute, some of which turn violent’.72 
Law can reduce or eliminate these violent responses to disputes over economic exchange 
by changing the incentives and attitudes of actors who would otherwise be compelled or 
tempted to invoke them. The most obvious way that the state can reduce the incidence of 
escalating cycles of vengeance is to insist on a monopoly of the legitimate use of violence, by 
criminalizing violent behaviour. The mere enactment of criminal prohibitions, however, does 
not automatically stop aggrieved parties from taking the law into their own hands unless the 
                                                        
71 Christopher Blattman, Alexandra C Hartman, and Robert A Blair, ‘How to Promote Order and Property 
Rights under Weak Rule of Law? An Experiment in Changing Dispute Resolution Behavior through 
Community Education’ (2014) 108 American Political Science Rev 100, 100.  
72 ibid. 
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prohibition on violence is actually enforced. Criminal prosecutions cost money, and the 
relevant authorities may simply have other priorities.  
So the state may further reduce the incentive to use violence by providing a calmer, more 
measured outlet for grievances in the courts. Some early forms of resolving disputes in the 
courts, like trial by battle, can be seen as a transitional stage between extra-legal violence and 
non-violent litigation.73 The origins of the common law lie in royal attempts to manage 
violent feuding74; as a first step, early legal systems aimed to regulate and control vengeance 
rather than to replace it. Likewise, so-called ‘[p]rimitive contract law … is affected strongly 
by elements of vengeance’.76 But modern contract law, as we will see below, aims to 
supplant rather than to satisfy the desire for revenge.  
B. Beyond Violence 
Violence is an unlikely outcome in many contemporary contractual settings: to large extent, 
criminal prohibitions and social norms do restrain violence. But violence is not the only kind 
of regrettable response to a dispute that contract law can help to forestall. A party to a dispute 
may have to expend time and energy on wrangling with her opponent and on trying to 
convince others that she is in the right. Bitterness, or a perceived need to maintain respect, 
may lead the parties to badmouth and defame each other, thereby harming not only the 
parties but also the broader market interest in accurate information.78 Most importantly, 
perhaps, parties who anticipate an acrimonious conflict may leap too quickly to the easiest 
self-help remedy: refusing to deal any further with the other party. An excessively 
                                                        
73 For a recent analysis, see Peter T Leeson, ‘Trial by Battle’ (2011) 3 J of Legal Analysis 341.  
74 Paul R Hyams, Rancor and Reconciliation in Medieval England (Cornell University Press 2003). Trial by 
battle, for example, rarely resulted in death because of rules limiting the weapons that champions could use. 
Leeson (n 73) 365. 
76 Llewellyn (n 25) 737. 
78 Contract law will not completely eliminate this kind of behaviour. For a recent example of a defamation suit 
after the breakdown of a contractual relationship, see Flymenow Ltd v Quick Air Jet Charter GmbH [2016] 
EWHC 3197 (QB).  
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pugnacious approach to disputes, then, may lead the parties to lose the opportunity for 
continued mutually beneficial exchange. The more bitter the dispute, the lower the possibility 
that the parties will maintain or resume their business relationship.  
As noted above, one way that having contract law can help to reduce the harms arising 
from disputes is to prevent disputes from arising in the first place. The goal of conflict-
minimization is thus not purely ‘backward-looking’; it cuts across Patrick Atiyah’s 
distinction between two kinds of social ends that the judicial process might be designed to 
serve.79 Atiyah distinguishes between, first, encouraging the citizenry to comply with socially 
desired standards of behaviour and, second, providing machinery for the settlement of 
disputes by fair and peaceful means. The goal of conflict-minimization is mostly obviously 
related to the second of these purposes, which responds to disputes after they have arisen. But 
by providing incentives to refrain from behaviour that is likely to give rise to a dispute, 
contract law can also prevent some disputes from arising at all. 
Still, some level of disputing is inevitable. How does contract law help to minimize the 
harms resulting from disputes after they have arisen? In part, it does so by channelling the 
parties’ emotional responses to conflict into the ‘cold courts’ that adjudicate breach of 
contract claims.80 It may seem paradoxical to claim that the prospect of litigation and the 
involvement of lawyers could reduce the time and effort that contracting parties spend 
fighting with each other. Lawyers might have self-interested incentives to stir up rather than 
to end conflicts, and are often accused (especially in the United States) of taking an 
excessively adversarial approach to disputes.81 One of Stewart Macaulay’s interviewees, for 
                                                        
79 PS Atiyah, ‘Contracts, Promises, and the Law of Obligations’ in Essays on Contract (Revised edn, OUP 
1990) 14–15. 
80 Balfour v Balfour [1919] 2 KB 571 (CA). 
81 Eg Robert A Kagan, ‘Do Lawyers Cause Adversarial Legalism? A Preliminary Inquiry’ (1994) 19 Law and 
Social Inquiry 1. 
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example, said that lawyers ‘just do not understand the give-and-take necessary in business’.82 
Moreover, according to David Campbell, contract law in its current form suffers from an 
inflexible ‘vindication mentality’ which ‘casts its pall over post-breach negotiations where 
reference to the contract takes the form of exchanges of surrenders of adversarially asserted 
claims’.83 It is hard to disagree with Campbell that contract law and the legal profession 
might be better designed to minimize conflict; but the question for the moment is just 
whether it makes some contribution to that aim.   
And indeed, there is ample evidence that, even in its current form, contract law helps to 
manage conflict. This may be most obvious when one looks to the lawyers who help to draft 
and negotiate contracts. Lawyers often convey the norms of a commercial community to their 
clients, helping to prevent disputes from arising.84 Moreover, once a dispute deteriorates to 
the point where litigation is a possibility, the prospect of litigation or arbitration typically 
requires the parties to turn the matter over to lawyers. Legal representatives bring objectivity 
to a dispute, with the capacity to calm it by explaining to clients the weaknesses of their 
position. Even when a dispute is in the hands of in-house lawyers, it is out of the hands of 
those who negotiated and attempted to perform the contract. As Macaulay points out, the 
shift to lawyers makes the dispute ‘less of a question of ego and responsibility for making 
what has turned out to be a bad bargain’.85  Moreover, as repeat players in legal disputes, 
lawyers often have a greater incentive than their clients to conduct disputes in a more 
                                                        
82 Macaulay (n 21) 61. 
83 Campbell (n 12) 471. See also Collins (n 12) 321–22: ‘The assertions of entitlement and correlative obligation 
which fuel the legal process of litigation and adjudication tend to exacerbate the conflict between the parties.’ 
84 Mark C Suchman and Mia L Cahill, ‘The Hired Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers and the Suppression of Disputes 
in Silicon Valley’ (1996) 21 Law and Social Inquiry 679. 
85 Stewart Macaulay, ‘Renegotiation and Settlements: Dr. Pangloss’s Notes on the Margins of David 
Campbell’s Papers’ (2007) 29 Cardozo L Rev 261, 284.  
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civilized manner.86 Further, because the legal system usually moves slowly, the possibility of 
a lawsuit requires one who considers herself a victim of wrongdoing to wait a little; the 
passage of time gives her the opportunity to reassess the extent of her loss and the other 
party’s blameworthiness, and to transcend her initial anger.87 The litigation system 
bureaucratizes disputes by requiring the disputants to seek advice from non-disputants, and 
by requiring the dispute to be conducted in the technical, even bland, discourse of the law.  
To a large extent, contract law encourages the minimization of conflict by encouraging 
the parties to lay down their arms and reach agreement.88 The prospect of having their 
arguments scrutinized by a neutral third party often serves as a ‘reality check’. It forces the 
parties to reflect more honestly on their own self-serving positions, inducing compromise. 
Again, the goal of conflict minimization fits better with the reality of contract litigation, the 
vast majority of which ends in a negotiated settlement rather than with adjudication, so much 
so that scholars of dispute resolution have suggested we refer to ‘litigotiation’ rather than 
litigation.89 For Collins, indeed, mutual agreement is the only way to bring about a peaceful 
resolution.90  
While settlement of contractual disputes is the paradigmatic conflict-ending event, 
however, it is not the only one. As a last resort, adjudication of a dispute by a third party can 
                                                        
86 Ronald J Gilson and Robert H Mnookin, ‘Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict between 
Lawyers in Litigation’ (1994) 94 Colum L Rev 509. 
87 For evidence supporting a similar claim in the case of tort litigation, see John Bronsteen, Christopher 
Buccafusco, and Jonathan S Masur, ‘Hedonic Adaptation and the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits’ (2008) 108 
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88 See Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law (Harvard UP 2004) ch 17, § 4.4: ‘an important 
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89 Marc Galanter, ‘Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach about Legal Process’ (1984) 34 J Leg Ed 268. 
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90 Collins (n 12) 322: ‘a peaceful resolution can occur only by agreement between the parties, so the objective of 
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effectively put an end to a dispute: the losing party accepts an adverse decision or, at least, is 
willing to concede defeat. A decision reached via a fair procedure is more likely to acquire 
legitimacy and, thus, to receive compliance.92 The effectiveness of a contract law regime at 
solving conflict, then, will depend in part on its perceived legitimacy among those who 
receive unfavourable decisions. 
2. Conflict-Minimization and the Design of Contract Law 
The goal of minimizing the negative consequences of disputes is not just a reason to have 
contract law in general; it also bears on the countless choices that a legal system has to make 
when deciding how to design and implement a system of contract law. Some of the most 
important choices concern the rules and practices of civil procedure. Depending on the 
content of these rules and practices, it is possible for litigation to exacerbate rather than 
ameliorate conflict. Prompted by this concern, the conflict-minimization imperative has 
plainly influenced English civil procedure in recent years. The Woolf Reforms, for example, 
were motivated by a sense that litigation was so adversarial as to be uncomfortably similar to 
warfare.93 Some of these developments in litigation practice are not unique to contract law: 
judges and parties, for example, are now required to consider ADR to promote an agreed 
settlement as an alternative to continued litigation.94 Some developments in procedural law 
are, however, specific to contract disputes. English courts have shown their willingness to 
enforce contractual clauses requiring the parties to mediate before commencing litigation.95 
                                                        
92 See Tom R Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (Yale UP, 1990). 
93 ‘Without effective judicial control … the adversarial process is likely to encourage an adversarial culture and 
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And the policy of deference to arbitration, a process used almost exclusively for contractual 
disputes, is based on the claim that arbitration is a faster, cheaper, and less wasteful way of 
conducting disputes.96  
But what of the substantive law of contract? How might it be affected by the dispute-
reduction goal? In this section, I will canvass some particular doctrines of contract law, with 
a focus on English law, to illustrate the role of conflict-minimization. The claim is not that 
English law is perfectly adapted to conflict-minimization. The claim, instead, that some of its 
doctrines make a significant contribution to this aim.  
To begin with, as a general matter, the goal of conflict-minimization tends to favour 
freedom of contract. One of the most important reasons to make contracts is to prevent 
disputes from arising by agreeing on what the parties’ obligations will be in certain 
contingencies.97 To encourage and support this practice, courts should typically enforce 
contracts as agreed. Further, where its meaning is unclear, they should usually interpret the 
text of written contracts in such a way as to minimize conflict.98 Moreover, there is more to 
contract law than interpreting and enforcing express terms of contracts. Many of the doctrines 
discussed below involve gap-filling by the courts where the parties have made no agreement 
on the contested matter; that gap-filling exercise is influenced by the aim of reducing 
conflict. In exceptional circumstances, legislatures and courts have decided to second-guess 
                                                        
96 This argument for arbitration, however, is now considered factually dubious by many. ‘It may then be said 
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the parties’ choice of contract terms where those terms are likely to lead to an unacceptable 
degree of conflict.99  
A. Default Remedies for Breach 
Consider, first, contract law’s general commitment to compensatory damages as the proper 
response to breach of contract. This commitment has two aspects: a preference for damages 
over specific enforcement of non-monetary obligations, and a commitment to compensation 
for loss rather than some higher amount of damages. From the perspective of theories of 
contract law based on promissory morality, each of these features has proved troublesome.100 
From a conflict-minimization perspective, however, each of these features is more readily 
understandable.  
First, English law is famously reluctant to require actual performance of non-monetary 
obligations.101 The law is not universally hostile to specific performance; instead, it allows 
judges to make decisions about when the remedy is appropriate. One important factor 
counting against specific enforcement is the need to help put an end to a dispute rather than 
prolong it. This factor looms large in contracts for personal services or for the continuing 
provision of services, where the ‘degree of the daily impact of person upon person’ is high.102 
This motivation is explicit in the leading case on specific performance, Co-operative 
Insurance v. Argyll.103 The case concerned a contractual obligation to keep a shop open, an 
                                                        
99 See sections 2.B and 2.C below. 
100 See Shiffrin (n 10). Schwartz and Markovits, however, have argued that the remedy of expectation damages 
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102 CH Giles & Co Ltd v Morris [1972] 1 WLR 307 (Ch) 318. 
103 Co-op Insurance Society v Argyll Stores [1999] AC 1 (HL). 
 23 
obligation the House of Lords found inappropriate for specific performance. In justifying this 
conclusion, Lord Hoffmann relied first on the standard law-and-economics argument that 
requiring a defendant to carry on a business at a loss is inefficient.104 But he also noted that 
such an order ‘yokes the parties together in a continuing hostile relationship’.105 If a court 
makes an order for specific performance in such circumstances, it ‘prolongs the battle’ 
between parties whose relationship has already deteriorated to a point where they are in 
court.106 If a defendant is required to continue running a business, ‘its conduct becomes the 
subject of a flow of complaints, solicitors’ letters and affidavits’.107 That would be wasteful 
for both parties and for the legal system. ‘An award of damages’, by contrast ‘brings the 
litigation to an end. The defendant pays damages, the forensic link between them is severed, 
they go their separate ways and the wounds of conflict can heal’.108  
The conflict-minimization explanation of the courts’ reluctance to order the continued 
performance of services is more convincing than the much-criticized idea that specific 
performance would require the court’s ‘constant supervision’.109 And it recurs in the case law. 
In another case, a court refused to enjoin termination of on the ground that awarding such 
relief would ‘require two parties who have fallen out with each other and one of whom has 
lost confidence in the other to continue to work together’.110 In another still, a court refused 
to order a fee-paying school to reinstate an expelled student, citing the ‘difficulties inherent 
                                                        
104 I bracket the considerable debate among law-and-economics scholars as to whether and when specific 
performance might be a more ‘efficient’ remedy than damages. See Alan Schwartz, ‘The Case for Specific 
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in the breakdown of trust and the undesirability of requiring parties to coexist in a pastoral or 
educational relationship’.111 In particular, conflict-minimization provides a significant part of 
the justification for the law’s refusal to order specific performance of an employee’s 
obligation to work, long enshrined in statute.112 A recent Supreme Court opinion notes ‘the 
sensitivity which the common law had always had about any intervention by a court which 
might force the parties to continue in a relationship which has been described as “at once 
inter-dependent and oppositional”’.113  
A conflict-management approach also fits well with contract law’s general commitment 
to compensation for loss as the measure of damages for breach. Contract law does not give 
effect to a vindictive desire to inflict suffering on a contract-breaker; it is not well suited to 
achieving retaliation for breach. 114 Certainly, those who bring contract claims may be 
motivated by the desire to take vengeance.115 The remedies the law offers, however, do not 
match that motivation.116 Punitive or exemplary damages are not awarded for breach of 
contract in English law;117 even awards of damages that strip the contract-breaker of the 
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profits of breacha remedy that may also be inspired by vindictive motives118are 
extremely rare.119  
At first sight, it might appear that, to provide an effective substitute for extra-legal 
vengeance, contract law would need itself to offer victims a form of retaliation, though one 
that is ‘limited and civilized through litigation’.120 And in some social conditions, where the 
law’s authority is weak, its best hope will be to provide a less harmful form of revenge. As 
we have already seen, the common law’s earliest responses to wrongdoing sought only to 
regulate and control vengeance.121 Contemporary contract law is more ambitious. In 
providing an alternative to vengeful extra-legal behaviour, courts hope also to avoid 
becoming instruments of vengeance. If a party trusts that a neutral decision-maker will make 
an unbiased and authoritative decision concerning its claim to redress, much of the reason to 
seek revenge is removed. Rather than inflicting retaliation for breach, contract law aims to 
make vengeance unnecessary. 
B. Agreed Remedies 
What if the parties seek to vary the law’s default rules by stipulating a different remedy for 
breach? The conflict-minimization goal generally supports the freedom of parties to specify 
the quantum of damages for breach. If the parties can agree in advance, they will greatly save 
on disputes over the numbers later. Another valid purpose, in conflict-management terms, is 
to prevent breach. If a penalty is so stiff as to provide a deterrent against breach, the parties 
may be spared a dispute: if there is no breach of contract, there will, perforce, be no dispute 
                                                        
118 Emily Sherwin, ‘Compensation and Revenge’ 40 San Diego L Rev 1387, 1403: ‘The claimant [seeking a 
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over the consequences of that breach. But even the otherwise-powerful principle of freedom 
of contract must sometimes give way to the interest in peaceful dispute resolution. The law 
has long limited the enforceability of agreements for supra-compensatory damage measures, 
even between commercial parties. While many commentators have found this limitation hard 
to explain,133 contractual clauses providing for punishment for breach risk exacerbating 
conflict, entailing unjustified harms to the parties and to others.134 As Seana Shiffrin has 
argued, the courts do not, and should not, cede total control over contractual remedies to the 
parties. In selecting remedies, the parties may not pay sufficient heed to the public purposes 
of punishment. These purposes ‘include an interest in replacing vengeance and private 
retaliation with deliberative and impartial remediation’.135  
Hence, a conflict-minimization perspective helps to support the U.K. Supreme Court’s 
recent decision to reaffirm, in modified form, the rule against penalties.136 The rule against 
penalties is still said to be based on a public policy ‘that the courts will not enforce a 
stipulation for punishment for breach of contract’,137 and the Court reiterated the idea that 
‘[t]he innocent party can have no proper interest in simply punishing the defaulter’.138 But it 
is now clear is that the fact that the primary purpose of a stipulation is deterrence of breach 
does not make it punishment.139  As a result, the meaning of ‘punishment’ in this context is 
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somewhat opaque,140 but it seems to mean something like vengeance. Some commentators 
have suggested that this understanding of the penalties rule will lead to the rule’s virtual 
exclusion from commercial cases, because ‘a contractual clause inserted purely to mete out 
punishment for punishment’s sake must be rara avis indeed’.141 Still, the retention of the 
jurisdiction over penalties allows the courts to strike down those clauses whose presence in 
the contract, however initially motivated, is particularly conducive to conflict and mutual 
retaliation once a dispute arises. 
Similar considerations underpin the (currently undeveloped) law on the enforceability of 
specific performance clauses.142 While the courts should generally accept the parties’ prior 
decision that specific performance should be available, freedom of contract must sometimes 
yield to the interest in minimizing conflict between the parties. In one of the few judicial 
discussions of this question, two Court of Appeal judges indicated that the discretion to order 
specific performance ‘cannot be fettered’ by the parties’ prior agreement;143 ‘it is not the 
function of the court to be a rubber stamp’.144 One important reason for the courts to retain 
the discretion to deny specific performance, even when the parties have previously agreed to 
it, is to put an end to a conflict-ridden contractual relationship.  
C. Self-Help and Repossession 
The goal of conflict minimization affects not only the remedies for breach of contract but 
also the means of enforcing them. An aggrieved party seeking payment of a debt or 
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compensation for breach cannot simply seize assets belonging to the breaching party. In 
general, at least, she must first convince a court that the money is owed, and, even then, must 
rely on court officers to ensure satisfaction against a recalcitrant defendant.   
Contracting parties may, however, seek to depart from the usual position, by providing 
for self-help entitlements to repossess property in a contract of sale, lease, or mortgage, as a 
remedy for non-payment. Here, too, freedom of contract often yields to the social interest in 
keeping disputes under control. Thus, in a residential tenancy, English law bars re-entry by a 
landlord without a court order.145 Adopting a similar rule, and departing from the prior 
common law rule that allowed self-help, an American court explained that there is ‘no cause 
to sanction such potentially disruptive self-help where adequate and speedy means are 
provided for removing a tenant peacefully through judicial process’.146 In this particular 
context, the law simply bars the use of this form of self-help, motivated in part by the fear 
that repossession attempts without a court’s imprimatur will spark violence.147  
In some other kinds of transactions, self-help repossession is allowed, but the law seeks to 
minimize its costs by placing a duty on the creditor to refrain from sparking a violent 
confrontation. In English law a mortgagee can repossess real property in the event of default 
without a court order, but only so long as her entry is ‘peaceable’.148 While landlords of 
commercial premises may seek repossession without a court order, they risk being found 
guilty of a criminal offense unless they can gain possession without using force.149 In the area 
of consumer goods sold on credit, American jurisdictions may not be doing enough to 
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discourage violence arising from repossession. The U.C.C. permits a secured lender to 
repossess collateral without a court order, but only if the lender ‘proceeds without breach of 
the peace’.150 Still, repossessions of vehicles in the United States sometimes end with 
property damage, and all too frequently conclude with serious injuries or death to the vehicle 
owner or the agent sent to repossess the property.152 
D. Transfer of Contractual Claims to Non-Parties 
Let us turn now to an area of contract law where the interest in conflict-management has 
perhaps been given insufficient weight in recent years: the law of assignment. Parties may 
want to transfer contractual claims to third parties for several reasons, particularly to finance 
credit. Historically, however, the desire to assign claims came up against a powerful 
countervailing idea, based on the conflict-minimization imperative. The idea was that legal 
claims should be considered personal to the original parties, and the same idea underpinned 
the much-eroded prohibitions on maintenance, champerty, and barratry, whose purpose was 
to limit third-party involvement in litigation and thereby to reduce its incidence.153 Influenced 
by this idea, the common law generally refused to recognize assignments of claims. 
According to Coke, allowing the transfer of claims to ‘strangers’ ‘would be the occasion of 
multiplying of contentions and suits’.154 
The common law’s near-absolute hostility to assignment is now understood to be an 
overreaction. But the current legal position may have swung too far in the other direction. As 
a result of equity’s intervention, English law is now strongly committed to assignability. The 
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normal rule is now that assignment of a debt claim is permissible even if the parties have not 
specifically provided for it.155 And while it is officially permissible for the parties to 
expressly prohibit assignment by a clause in their contract,156 courts have shown themselves 
remarkably willing to allow creditors to evade such clauses using the simple expedient of a 
declaration of trust.157 The original policy reason against assignment seems now to have been 
almost forgotten: contemporary writers on assignment often treat the common law’s position 
on assignment as the product of unreasoned formalism.159 This assumption is apparently 
shared by government: new regulations will soon guarantee enforceability of assignments of 
receivables even in the teeth of express clauses barring assignment.160 
The conflict-minimization perspective, however, suggests that we should treat with 
caution English law’s current extreme enthusiasm for assignment. When parties agree to 
contracts, they typically imagine that a subsequent contractual dispute will be dealt with in 
the context of the parties’ existing and continuing relationship.162 That relationship will often 
impose economic, moral, and reputational limits on, for example, the creditor’s urge to 
squeeze an unfortunate debtor faced with unforeseen payment difficulties. But once the claim 
is transferred to someone else, the relationship no longer restrains the excessive pursuit of 
contractual entitlements. Particularly problematic is the assignment of debt claims to parties 
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whose sole business is debt-collection. Such parties have no reputational need to act 
reasonably in the context of a dispute. ‘Vulture funds’ who assume rights under contracts 
lack the incentive to temper their litigation behaviour. Indeed, shorn of any kind of business 
apart from debt enforcement, they have the strategic incentive to promote a reputation for 
extreme tactics in the hope that they will frighten debtors into payment, regardless of the 
validity of the debts.163 Some debtors may simply capitulate; others will fight back. At the 
seedier end of the market, debt collection companies who purchase bad debts appear to be 
significantly more likely than the original debtors to turn to violence in the pursuit of 
money.164  
These considerations would not justify a rule banning assignment of contractual claims. 
Subject to generally-applicable caveats about inequality of bargaining power and surprising 
terms in standard form contracts, we can expect commercial parties who sign up explicitly 
for assignability to have weighed the costs against the benefits. But the need to minimize 
conflict does suggest that the law should be less ready to presume assignability where the 
parties have not expressly agreed to it. Most of all, the argument from conflict-minimization 
provides a significant reason for non-assignment clauses to be respected rather than 
overridden. 
E. Strict Liability 
Liability for breach of contract in common law jurisdictions is generally not based on fault.165 
Except in narrow circumstances where a court will find a contract to be frustrated, a 
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breaching party is liable for failure to perform or for poor performance even though she took 
all due care. Moreover, while the mitigation rules sometimes amount to something similar, 
there is, in common law jurisdictions, generally no defence of contributory negligence.166 
Some critics have seen in this general fault-insensitivity a divergence from morality or from 
the demands of economic efficiency.167  
From a conflict-reduction perspective, however, strict liability is less puzzling. Keeping 
fault out of contractual adjudication may have its downsides, but it makes disputes less costly 
and relationships less acrimonious. Economic analysts have captured part of the reason strict 
liability reduces the costs of disputing. Breaches of strict liability rules are typically more 
readily observable and verifiable than breaches of standards that turn on fault. Other things 
being equal, liability based on fault leads to more potential arguments, more litigation, and 
less effective contracts. According to Robert Scott, ‘[t]he fact that fault regimes increase the 
likelihood and costs of disputes explains why parties may prefer contracts that only crudely 
encourage efficient behavior but significantly reduce the contracting costs of enforcement’.168 
This economic understanding of litigation costs provides an important insight. But it 
should be supplemented by a richer understanding of the dynamics of contractual 
relationships and disputes. In a useful start, Shiffrin has recently claimed that strict liability 
‘reduce[s] potential sources of conflict between the parties’.169 Under strict liability, the 
promisee is relieved of a reason to monitor the promisor’s conduct closely. She need not 
scrutinize the promisor’s efforts to assess whether any potential failure to perform is down to 
the promisor’s fault. The absence of intrusive scrutiny reduces the incidence of potentially 
troublesome flashpoints and encourages a more cooperative relationship of trust between the 
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parties. Liability based on fault, on the other hand, contributes to a culture of contractual 
blame. The attribution of blame is likely to lead to a downward spiral, contributing to 
ruptures in the relationship, to prolonged conflict, lingering mistrust, and mutual enmity.  
In the rather different, but analogous, context of marriage law, similar considerations 
support the trend towards marginalizing questions of fault on divorce. ‘No-fault’ divorce, 
available in most American jurisdictions, is ‘a more civilized alternative to the adversarial 
model that has decreased the acrimony and hostility between spouses’.171 In England, by way 
of contrast, unless the couple has been living apart for at least two years, divorce must be 
based either on adultery or ‘unreasonable behaviour’.172 Campaigners argue that this fault-
based divorce system creates conflict, makes it more difficult to reach an agreed settlement, 
burdens the courts, and harms the couple’s children.173 While the context of economic 
exchange that generally characterizes contract law is admittedly distinct, the fundamental 
point remains that, whatever the costs of foregoing this inquiry, there is some benefit to the 
parties, and to others, in avoiding adjudication of questions of fault. 
F. Rules, Standards, and Settlements 
If dispute-reduction is one of contract law’s goals, doctrinal rules should, other things being 
equal, seek to induce parties to settle their differences out of court. Settlements reduce the 
costs of disputing, most obviously, by removing the need for the parties to invest further 
resources in litigation. They also save court resources, freeing up scarce judicial attention to 
be used where it is needed elsewhere. Enthusiasts for settlements also claim that they 
typically have greater legitimacy in the eyes of the parties than adjudicated outcomes, that 
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they are more likely to be complied with, and they are more likely to leave the parties 
satisfied.174  
Contract law scholars sometimes make arguments about would best encourage parties to 
settle their differences out of court rather than litigate them.175 But there is no consensus as to 
how best to do it. One overarching disagreement is whether ‘rules’ or ‘standards’ are more 
likely to induce settlement in the event of dispute. On one view, crisp, clear contract law 
rules are more likely to lead to harmony between the parties. Scott’s article on adjustments to 
long-term contracts provides an example.178 He rejects claims that courts should assert a 
power to adjust contracts when unexpected events happen. Rather than trying to incorporate 
flexible relational norms into legal adjudication, courts should apply predictable, binary rules. 
The point is not that parties should always perform the original terms of the contract; the 
point, rather, is that the parties themselves should settle their dispute and decide how to 
renegotiate the deal. The best courts can hope to do is provide a clear baseline for the parties; 
unpredictable judicial practices will only increase contracting costs. Scott thus contends that 
legal certainty is more likely to help the parties to continue their cooperative relationship. 
Another view, championed by Macaulay, argues that the best way for courts to induce 
consensual settlement of disputes is instead to apply broad, unpredictable standards.179 
Macaulay argues that the goal of much180 contract law should be to induce ‘acceptable, if not 
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ideal, settlements’.181 If parties shift from being contractual partners to adversaries in 
litigation, their relationship of trust and reciprocal obligation is likely to fall apart. An 
expensive and unpredictable legal system, particularly where courts are willing to refashion 
contractual language in the light of subsequent circumstances, may be better than a system 
where the parties have clear and easy-to-enforce rights; the lack of predictability frightens 
parties off litigation. As Macaulay admits, his claim has an air of paradox. The legal system 
holds itself out as willing and able to solve the parties’ disputes, but, in reality, discourages 
them from availing of its services. Still, ‘[i]n all but unusual situations’, Macaulay contends, 
‘flexible doctrine will provoke settlements … With all of its flaws, such coerced cooperation 
may be the least bad solution in many situations’.182  
This article is not the place to resolve the debate between Scott and Macaulay. 
Macaulay’s claim that open-ended standards are more likely to induce settlement is, he 
concedes, based on hunch and anecdote rather than rigorous empirical evidence; something 
similar might be said about Scott’s opposing viewpoint. For present purposes, the point is to 
highlight what Scott and Macaulay share: the view that inducing settlement, and thereby 
limiting conflict between the parties, should be a goal for contract law.  
3. Conflict-Minimization as a Justifiable Goal for Contract Law 
But is it right to consider the minimization of conflict a goal for contract law at all?  Here, as 
in other fields,183 arguments in favour of stability can be met with powerful counterarguments. 
There is, in particular, a perceived danger that, in the pursuit of peace, the law will lose sight 
of justice. One way of expressing this concern is to say that, if a legal system bases its 
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decision to recognize legal claims on the fact that litigation is preferable to extra-legal 
retaliation, such recognition is tantamount to ‘buying off’ an unworthy retaliatory urge.184 An 
alternative way of stating a similar concern would be to rely on Seana Shiffrin’s contention 
that contract law must be consistent with the maintenance of a moral culture of promising.185 
Too great a focus on minimizing conflict, for example by encouraging out-of-court 
settlements over public adjudication, might contribute to the erosion of such a moral culture.  
Yet another way to voice this kind of worry is to point out that pursuing social stability as an 
end in itself tends to reinforce the interests of those who hold greater power and resources. 
To take a concrete example from the world of contractual relationships, supply arrangements 
between UK supermarkets and their suppliers are said by some suppliers to be marked by a 
climate of fear, in which suppliers are afraid to complain about the misbehaviour of 
supermarkets.186 In such circumstances, conflict may be minimized, but the resulting state of 
affairs is far from attractive. If the supermarkets are unwilling to keep their contracts, we 
might say, the law should be facilitating more disputes between the parties. 
For some commentators on recent trends in civil justice, this danger—that the desire to 
reduce conflict might frustrate the law’s underlying purposes—is embodied in the policy of 
promoting out-of-court settlement. Supporters and critics alike agree that a sea change has 
occurred in the way that government and the judiciary thinks about civil justice in recent 
decades.187 Courts, previously understood as third-party adjudicators whose role is to provide 
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judgment, are now directed to encourage parties end their disputes by agreement, including 
by ordering mediation and other forms of alternative dispute resolution. Too great an 
emphasis on dispute resolution, the critics say, undermines the pursuit of public values 
through litigation.188  
This concern is certainly relevant to contract law. Macaulay, who, as we saw above, has 
written of the advantages of settlements of contract disputes, has also noted their downsides: 
‘insofar as the law of contract is thought to advance social norms other than the peaceful 
resolution of disputes, a system of negotiation will defeat those values’.189  Commentators 
worry, moreover, that dispute resolution outside the courts hinders the important public good 
of clarifying and developing rights.190 This concern is not limited to circumstances of unequal 
bargaining power between the parties; the Lord Chief Justice recently argued that the 
prevalence of commercial arbitration undermines the development of the common law, 
stymies its ability to provide certainty, and prevents it from adapting to changing business 
practices.191 These considerations should be sufficient to convince anyone that a system of 
contract law that took conflict-minimization as its sole goal would be unacceptable. While 
one can imagine a system of litigation that regards itself solely as a conflict-management 
process, such a system would be appropriate only to what Mirjan Damaška has called a 
‘reactive state’ with no goals of its own.192  
But this article’s claim is the more modest one that conflict-minimization is one of the 
values to which contract law should answer. Other things being equal, avoiding the negative 
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consequences of conflict brings about a gain for human well-being. Conflict-minimization 
entails harms avoided or, at least, it means that otherwise wasted time and effort spent 
wrangling over the terms of economic exchange can be put to some more useful purpose. 
True, the law should not, even in principle, try to reduce the costs of disputes to zero. The 
law should be seeking to facilitate the optimal level and kinds of dispute. Some costs must be 
incurred to reap significant benefits, in the shape of better deterrence of wrongful behaviour, 
the facilitation of beneficial transactions, contributions to distributive justice, and so on. But, 
from this perspective, if the law can decrease the harms resulting from disputes without 
unduly compromising on other goals, then it should do so. Where the parties to an agreement 
for economic exchange are of roughly equal strength, this is often likely to be the case: the 
avoidance and early settlement of disputes is, in such cases, likely to be mutually beneficial 
rather than the result of one party imposing its will on the other.   
Conflict-minimization is most obviously congenial to instrumentalist accounts, those that 
seek contract law’s value in the good consequences that it brings about.194 More subtly, my 
account also shares something with civil recourse theories of private law. While civil 
recourse theorists are a diverse bunch,195 they unite in stressing the significance of private 
rights of action to understanding private law.196 Private rights of action permit, but do not 
require, the victim of wrongdoing to act against the wrongdoer: they give the victim a power 
to act against the wrongdoer through the state. But the victim of wrongdoing may choose not 
to exercise that power; she may also choose to give it up in exchange for an agreed settlement. 
In this way, civil recourse theory emphasises a feature of private law (including contract law) 
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that is central to conflict-minimization. By leaving it to the victim to commence an action for 
breach, contract law avoids the creation of a legal dispute where the parties are content to 
proceed without one. And by allowing the victim to cease a claim for breach after having 
commenced it, contract law facilitates the consensual termination of disputes.  
In some respects, however, my argument clashes with the commitments of some 
particular civil recourse theorists. The minority of civil recourse theorists who view private 
law liabilities as a means for getting revenge will take issue with my claim that contract law 
aspires to replace, rather than effectuate, vengeance.197 As another point of contrast, the 
argument of this article is avowedly instrumental, whereas many proponents of civil recourse 
theory reject instrumentalism as a means of understanding private law.198 
Is it possible to accommodate conflict-minimization considerations within a non-
instrumental account of contract law? To a large extent, this will depend on the content of the 
particular non-instrumental account in question. For a committed Kantian, for example, the 
fact that some rule or practice of contract law will reduce conflict more generally is simply 
irrelevant to the content of the private law relation between the two contracting parties.   
Some degree of inconsistency between the conflict-minimization imperative and 
deontological perspectives is unavoidable. But the clash between conflict-minimization and 
deontological perspectives may be less jarring than it first seems.199  Deontological theories 
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of contract law in their different forms take as their core notion the duty to abide by the terms 
of one’s promise or agreement.200 Much of contract law consists in interpreting the meaning 
of promises or agreements where the parties have not made an express choice about their 
rights and duties. Courts aiming to be faithful to the implicit meaning of contractual promises 
or agreements will pay regard to conflict-minimization because the parties themselves 
typically consider it a significant aim. As Ian Macneil has argued at the level of theory,202 and 
Stewart Macaulay has shown empirically,203 contracting parties typically adhere to norms 
requiring cooperation, flexibility, and compromise in the face of conflict. And they often 
write conflict-soothing provisions, like mediation agreements, into their contracts. Typically, 
if asked, the parties would agree to the law’s efforts to control subsequent disputes, because 
doing so is likely to serve their joint interests. More than elsewhere, the concern that focusing 
on conflict-minimization will impair other goals is often muted in contract disputes.204 In 
many circumstances, there is no real clash between peace and justice. Pursuing conflict-
minimization is, instead, part of what it means for a court to do justice.  
Conclusion 
Contract law is worth having in significant part because it minimizes the negative 
consequences of conflict. The value of conflict-minimization is not uniquely relevant to 
contract law. But in this particular area of law, recent trends in civil justice may not be so 
deeply at odds with the underlying purposes of substantive law as is sometimes claimed.  Still, 
taking conflict-minimization as a goal for contract law gives rise to a host of challenging 
questions. To what extent does contract law in its current form actually achieve this goal? 
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Exactly what sort of shadow does contract law cast on settlement negotiations?206 How might 
legal doctrine, judicial practice, and lawyerly culture be improved so as to contribute to the 
goal of reducing the negative consequences of conflict? To serve this goal, to what extent 
should the private law of contracts be supplemented by regulatory action? How much do the 
answers to these questions depend on the kind of contractual dispute under consideration? 
The aim of this article has been to establish that these questions are worth pursuing. 
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